Introduction
The recent years have seen an exponential rise of the so called "gig economy", broadly consisting of online and in-person work relationships that are facilitated "on-demand" or "just-in-time" by online platforms (De Stefano 2015) . While this paradigm has ushered in new opportunities for flexible employment in the economy, navigating the uncertainties associated with short-term contractual work can be daunting. This paper is motivated by the goal of empowering workers and service providers on these platforms to take effective operational decisions in these complex and uncertain settings.
In particular, this paper is concerned with the revenue management challenges faced by workers on platforms where they individually make their own pricing decisions. Examples include platforms that match semi-skilled or skilled labor to tasks of heterogeneous nature, like Upwork, Taskrabbit, or Thumbtack, but do not include ride-sharing platforms like Uber and Lyft, where the pricing is centrally regulated by the platform. These latter pricing decisions have received considerable attention from an operational perspective in recent literature (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2015 , Bimpikis et al. 2016 , Taylor 2017 , Cachon et al. 2017 , Castillo et al. 2017 . However, despite the presence of several blogs and online forums that informally and anecdotally discuss various aspects of the issue of freelancer pricing, 1 it has received little formal attention from the scientific community.
To a large extent, similar revenue management challenges are faced by service providers on online rental marketplaces like Airbnb for lodgings, Turo or Getaround for cars, etc.
In this paper, I consider the central problem faced by a worker on an on-demand service platform, which is that of optimally pricing her services to maximize earnings. Because of uncertainty and heterogeneity in the job durations, workers typically use per-unit-time pricing (e.g., hourly), which allows the the payment to scale linearly with the duration of a job.
2 Consequently, the focus is on such per-unit-time pricing strategies.
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A key feature of the on-demand service economy is that there are no "per worker" queues: if a particular worker is unavailable, the customer simply chooses some other worker or leaves the platform. Hence, from the perspective of a worker, accepting a job incurs an opportunity cost of losing all the jobs that could have been accepted while the worker is busy. The optimal price per-unit-time for a job thus needs to internalize the per-unit-time opportunity cost, which is the ratio of the expected earnings lost due to accepting the job and the expected duration of the job.
The first contribution of this paper is to highlight that, depending on system characteristics and class specific features like distributions of the job durations, particulars of the arrival processes, etc., there could be an asymmetry in the per-unit-time opportunity costs incurred by different classes of jobs. And in these cases, price discrimination across these classes may be necessary to maximize earnings even if there is no difference in the beliefs about the customers' per-unit-time willingness to pay. The following example is a bit contrived, but it nevertheless illustrates this point. Another example of practical interest (which may be read at this point) will be presented in Section 2.2.
Example. Consider two types of customers: type A customers bring a job of length 1 hour and type B customers bring a job of length 2 hours. The willingness to pay per hour for each customer type is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Type A customers arrive at times t = 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . and type B customers arrive at times t = 1, 3, 5, 7, . . .. Now, accepting a job of type A does not incur any opportunity cost since it will be finished in time to be able to accept the next job. Thus the optimal hourly price for this job can be independently computed to be 1/2 per hour. On the other hand, accepting a customer of type B does incur an opportunity cost: the next arriving customer of type
A cannot be accepted. This necessitates a reserve value on the hourly price for job type B resulting from the requirement that the total earning from the job is at least as much as the optimal expected earning from the type A job that would be lost. Consequently, the optimal hourly price for job type B is higher than 1/2.
The second contribution of this paper is to establish that if the customers' arrival process is
Poisson, and if their per-unit-time valuations are drawn from an identical distribution, the optimal pricing strategy that maximizes the long-run average earning charges a single rate for all jobs. In other words, in this case, the per-unit-time opportunity costs are identical across jobs irrespective of their durations. Discounting earnings over time, i.e., giving more importance to the earnings obtained earlier, does not affect this result. Hence, any price discrimination must result from differences in the distributions of the customers' willingness to pay.
I present this particular finding with some hesitancy, since once the question is appropriately formalized, the result is mathematically trivial. However, it may not be quite as obvious, and could provide useful guidance to workers and service providers as they undertake their pricing decisions.
For example, the desire to improve capacity utilization in the face of arrival uncertainty may tempt a worker to prioritize longer jobs by offering them a lower hourly price as compared to jobs that are expected to be relatively short, even if the customers' hourly willingness to pay is believed to be identically distributed across jobs. 4 This temptation may be stronger if the worker is time sensitive and wishes to maximize discounted earnings. The result implies that such intuition is unfounded.
This brings us to the the third and final contribution of the paper. Under the same setting of Poisson arrivals, I consider the problem of choosing the optimal set of prices for multiple customer classes that are differentiated in their per-unit-time willingness to pay. I present key structural insights into the optimal prices in this case, finally culminating in a practically attractive iterative procedure that converges to these prices under standard regularity assumptions on the distribution of customer valuations.
The analysis hinges on the observation that the per-unit-time opportunity cost of accepting a job from any customer class is in fact the optimal earning rate. If this rate is known, then the optimal pricing problem decomposes across classes into a set of independent optimal pricing decisions with a reserve price equal to the optimal earning rate. Effectively, these are basic optimal product pricing decisions. Since the optimal rate is not known, a natural iterative scheme for a worker is to start with a guess for the optimal earning rate, compute the optimal prices independently for each customer class, estimate the resulting earning rate, recompute the optimal prices, and so on. I
show that under the regularity assumptions on the distribution of valuations, this procedure indeed converges to the set of optimal prices and the optimal earning rate. where I analyze the structure of the optimal prices and finally present the iterative algorithm for computing these prices. The paper ends with a discussion of possible future directions in Section 4.
Related work. Pricing in service systems has been a topic of long and considerable interest in literature; see Hassin and Haviv (2003) for a survey. Three works most relevant to the present setting are Ziya et al. (2006), Ziya et al. (2008) and Caro and Simchi-Levi (2012) . Ziya et al. (2006) considers the optimal pricing problem faced by a service facility with a single server and a queue with a finite capacity (which could be 0, as in our setting), when the customer valuations are drawn from a common distribution. Both Ziya et al. (2008) and Caro and Simchi-Levi (2012) analyze the case of multiple heterogeneously distributed customer classes in a similar setting. Although these settings are more general, the main difference in the present work is that my primary focus is on disentangling the impact of system characteristics from that of customer preferences on optimal pricing. Ziya et al. (2006) assumes that the service time -which is a key job characteristic that I consider -is identically distributed for all jobs. While this assumption is not important in Ziya et al. (2008) and Caro and Simchi-Levi (2012) , these works are focused on the case of heterogeneous customers, where it is clear that price-discrimination is necessary for optimality. Also, none of these works consider the optimization of time discounted earnings.
The analysis of the optimal pricing problem in the multi-class case relies on a reduction of the problem to solving a scalar fixed point relation that is satisfied by the optimal earning rate (as implied by the earlier discussion). A similar reduction has been shown for a more general queueing system in Caro and Simchi-Levi (2012) . A related reduction to a scalar optimization problem also appears in Ziya et al. (2008) . But neither of these reductions lead to a natural computational procedure. The convergence of the iterative procedure that I propose to the optimal prices relies on a crucial property that is satisfied in the present setting: the optimal earning rate not only satisfies the fixed point relation, it is also the maximizer of the corresponding function.
Homogeneous customers
Consider a single worker on an on-demand service platform. Customers are of K types. Let the set of types be denoted as K {1, . . . , K}. Service requests to the worker from customers of type k arrive according to a Poisson process with the rate of λ k per hour. The durations of the jobs they bring are distributed according to G k with mean 1/µ k hours. Let ρ k λ k /µ k denote the load of the customer channel k and let ρ k ρ k denote the total load. Each customer i has a maximum price v i that she is willing to pay per hour, which is drawn from a common distribution F . Let F = 1 − F denote the tail distribution function. The worker chooses an hourly rate p k for job type k. An arriving customer's job is accepted by the worker only if she is idle and if the customer is willing to pay the hourly rate. While the worker is busy working on the job, all the arriving customers are lost forever (they are assumed to have chosen some other worker on the platform or to have left the platform altogether). While the worker is busy, she accrues a cost of c per unit time. The goal of the worker is to choose the prices p k that maximize her long-run rate of earning.
We first derive an expression for the long-run average earning of the worker as a function of the price vector p. Observe that since the arrival process is Poisson, the total earning until time t, denoted as R(t), is a renewal reward process where each renewal cycle consists of the worker becoming idle after finishing a job, then accepting the first paying job that arrives (such jobs arrive at the rate F (p k )λ k for each type k), and then finishing the job. Let W 1 be the total earning in the first cycle and let S 1 be the length of that cycle. Then from the renewal reward theorem Gallager (2013), the long-run average earning of the worker as a function of p is given by:
Now since the arrival process is Poisson, the expected time till the first paying job arrives in a renewal cycle is 1/( k ∈K λ k F (p k )). Also, the first paying job that arrives in a renewal cycle is of type k with probability
We finally get
The following result is the first main finding of the paper. Theorem 1. There exists an optimal strategy for the worker that chooses the same hourly price across all customer types.
Proof. Recall that ρ = k∈K ρ k and denote α k = ρ k /ρ. Then for any price vector p, we have,
But the latter is the problem of choosing the single optimal hourly price for all jobs, given that the total load is ρ = k∈K ρ k .
Discounted earnings
In this section, I show that discounting the earnings over time does not affect the previous result.
As before, let p k be the hourly price for job type k. Let X(t) ∈ {0} ∪ K be the state of the worker at time t, beginning from the state X(0) = 0. Here, the state 0 signifies that the worker is idle, and state k ∈ K signifies that the worker is busy with a job of type k. Then (X(t)) t∈R ≥0 is a continuous time stochastic process that is càdlàg, i.e., its sample paths are right continuous with left limits.
Let R(x) be the earning rate in state x, where R(0) = 0 and R(k) = p k − c for k ∈ K. Let γ > 0 be the discount factor. Then the total expected discounted reward is given by:
Let T be an exponential random variable with mean 1/γ, independent of (X(t)) t∈R ≥0 . Consider a modified stochastic process (X(t)) t∈R ≥0 , defined asX(t) = X(t)1 {t<T } + a1 {t≥T } by introducing a new absorbing state a K +1 such that R(a) = 0. Clearly, if (X(t)) t∈R ≥0 is càdlàg, then (X(t)) t∈R ≥0
is càdlàg as well. Then it is straightforward to see that R γ (p) is the expected total earning in this modified process, i.e.,
Define β(0) = R γ (p), and for k ∈ K, define,
whereX(u − ) = lim t↑uX (t). Thus, β(k) is the expected total earning until absorption starting from the state where a job of type k has just been accepted by the worker. For each k ∈ K, let X k ∼ G k , and let Y ∼ exp(1/γ), such that Y is independent of X k . We then get the following set of first step equations for computing β(0). First, we have,
where
is the probability that the process enters state k before absorption. Also, for each k ∈ K, we have,
The first term in the expression on the right is the expected earning after accepting a job until either the job is finished or the process enters the absorbing state. The expected time till either of those two events occur is E[min(X k , Y )]. The second term results from the fact that the process enters state 0, i.e., the job gets finished before absorption, with probability P (X k < Y ). Solving, we get,
or,
, we finally have,
We now need the following fact.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be independent non-negative random variables such that Y is exponentially distributed with mean 1/γ. Then,
Proof. We have,
Conditioned on the event {Y ≤ X}, Y has a truncated exponential distribution, and its mean can be computed to be (see Chap. 4, Lemma 4.3 in Olive (2008) ),
Thus,
This, coupled with the fact that P (Y ≤ X | X) = 1 − exp(−γX) implies the result.
Thus, we finally have,
Using the same argument as that in the proof of Theorem 1, it is straightforward to establish that there exists an optimal policy that sets the same hourly price for each customer class. This is the policy that maximizes the long-run average earning given that the total load isρ = k∈Kρ k ,
For instance, if the job durations are exponentially distributed, then
A remark
In this section, I take a short detour and present an example to show that Poisson arrivals are not sufficient for the previous result in an arbitrary system. Consider the case where the customers could be patient, i.e., they are willing to wait for the worker to become free before choosing someone else. This could naturally model traditional freelancing settings where the worker has developed a sustained relationship with a class of customers who prefer her services over other workers. I numerically demonstrate than in these cases, the previous result may not hold, i.e., even under
Poisson arrivals, price discrimination may be necessary for optimality despite identically distributed customer preferences. If an arriving customer sees another customer waiting, then she leaves the system. In other words, the queue has capacity 1 and customers do not leave without being served once they are in queue.
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For a pair of prices p 1 and p 2 for the two classes, since the arrival process is Poisson, the reward process till any time t is a renewal reward process. Each renewal cycle begins with the worker being idle, and ends when the worker finishes a job and there is no customer in queue. The long-run average rate of earning in this case can be computed to be,
The details of this computation can be found in the Appendix. Suppose that we fix λ 1 = µ 1 = 1 and set λ 2 = µ 2 = r, so that ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 1. In Figure 1 , I plot the optimal prices as r varies from 0 to 1 and then from 1 to 100. 6 This allows us to see the effect on the optimal prices of changing the job length of class B while keeping the overall load the same as that of class A. Observe that when the expected job length of class B is larger than that of class A (r < 1), the optimal price p * 2 is larger than p * 1 . The inequality is reversed when r > 1, i.e., when class B jobs are shorter than class A jobs. This suggests that in these cases, the expected opportunity cost doesn't necessarily grow linearly in the length of the job. 
Price differentiation with heterogeneous customers
Coming back to the on-demand setting where there are no per-worker queues, it is now clear that under Poisson arrivals, any price differentiation must stem from the fact that the beliefs about the customers' willingness to pay are different across different classes. In this section, I present structural insights into the optimal prices in this case and finally present a procedure to compute these prices under certain standard assumptions. Let F k be the distribution of hourly valuations of customers in class k ∈ K, with support on [0,v k ]. I assume that each F k is differentiable on its support (with right and left derivatives defined for its two end points). LetF k = 1 − F k and f k denote the corresponding tail distribution functions and densities respectively. It is straightforward to establish as we did earlier, that for a price vector p, the long-run average earning is given by:
The partial derivative of R(p) with respect to p i is given by,
Thus, from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions, we obtain that the optimal prices p * satisfy:
for all i ∈ K. Here, R * is the optimal rate of earning. These conditions are quite intuitive. R * is indeed the opportunity cost per hour of being busy. Thus, the hourly earning while working on any job, p * i −c, must at least be R * . The quantity
is the virtual hourly valuation, which is a standard quantity that appears in the theory of optimal pricing (for example, see Myerson 1981) . The basic tenet of optimal pricing of a product tells us to equate the virtual valuation to the marginal cost of production. Analogously, in this case we equate the virtual hourly valuation to the hourly service cost plus the hourly opportunity cost. Of course, it may be the case that these costs are too high for a particular customer class, in which case it is better to simply not serve that class; this is the second condition.
The optimality conditions imply that given the optimal opportunity costs, the optimal pricing problem can be decomposed across the different customer classes. This decomposition is very attractive from a practical standpoint. For a fixed hourly opportunity cost R ≥ 0, for each k ∈ K, consider the optimization problem,
The first derivative of the objective function is given by,
Suppose that F k has a non-decreasing hazard rate for each k ∈ K, i.e.,
This has been referred to as the MHR (monotone hazard rate) or IFR (increasing failure rate) assumption in the mechanism design literature. In this case, the entire function in the parenthesis is increasing. Thus, from the first order optimality condition, we can conclude that the optimal value of p that solves (18) is unique: it isv k ifv k ≤ c + R, otherwise it is the unique value of p that
With some abuse of notation, let us denote this optimal value as p k (R). It is straightforward to verify that under the assumptions on F k , the function p k (R) defined on R + is continuous, and moreover differentiable at all points exceptv k − c. Also, both left and right derivatives exist atv k − c. Further, p k (R) ≥ 0 for all R <v k − c (the optimal price is non-decreasing in R) and p k (R) = 0 for all R >v k − c. Atv k − c, we have the left derivative
Then, under the MHR assumption, the KKT conditions are equivalent to saying that the optimal earning rate R * satisfies the fixed point relation:
A similar characterization has been obtained for a more general setting with a finite capacity queue in Caro and Simchi-Levi (2012) , where the uniqueness of the fixed point has also been claimed (without proof) under similar assumptions. The following result shows that in our setting, not only is the fixed point unique, but it is also the maximizer of the response function. This latter result is key to obtaining a natural computational procedure.
Lemma 2. Suppose that F k has a non-decreasing hazard rate on its support for each k ∈ K.
Then, there is a unique R * that satisfies the fixed point relation (19). Moreover, R * maximizes the function,
Proof. First, note that a fixed point always exists since the optimal earnings and the optimal set of prices define such a fixed point. We first establish that it is unique. It is straightforward to verify that the function M (R) defined on R + is continuous, and differentiable at all points except {v k − c; k ∈ K}. Also at these points, both left and right derivatives exist (these properties follow from the corresponding properties of p k (R)). Then at any point R the right-derivative of M (R)
can be expressed as,
Here p k+ (R) is the right-derivative of p k at R. Let R * be a fixed point of M , i.e., M (R * ) = R * .
Then we have,
From the optimality conditions for p k (R * ), we have that
This implies that for any R * , there is an such that for all R that satisfy R * < R < R * + ,
This implies that the function M (R) is non-increasing after R * .
Hence, there can be only one fixed point R * .
Now consider a point R < R * . Since M (0) > 0, and M is continuous, we have
implies that the function M is non-decreasing for R < R * . This shows that M (R) is maximized at R * (with a maximum value R * ).
We can now show the following main result of this section.
Theorem 2. Starting from any R 0 ≥ 0, the sequence (R t ) t∈N obtained by the relation R t+1 = M (R t ) converges to the unique fixed point R * of M (R). R * is the optimal rate of earning and the corresponding prices p k (R * ) for k ∈ K are the optimal prices.
Proof. Since M (R) ≤ R * , for any R 0 , we have that R t ≤ R * for t ≥ 1. Moreover, R t+1 = M (R t ) > R t for any R t < R * . Thus (R t ) t∈N; t≥1 is a monotonically increasing sequence bounded by R * , and hence converges to R * by the monotone convergence theorem.
Example. Consider two customer classes with loads ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 1. The hourly willingness to pay of class 1 is uniformly distributed in [0, 1] , and that of class 2 is uniformly distributed in [0, 2]. Thus 2] . Suppose that the hourly cost of service is 0.
For a given hourly reserve price R, p k (R) solves max(p−R)(1−p) for k = 1 and max(p−R)(1−p/2) for k = 2. We thus obtain p 1 (R) = 1+R 2
Thus for R ≤ 1, we obtain,
And for R ∈ (1, 2], we obtain, Figure 2 , where one can see that its unique fixed point is its maximizer. This is the point R * ≈ 0.40589. Thus the optimal hourly prices are Figure 3 shows the convergence of the iterative procedure to R * from different starting points. The convergence is quick (the plot shows 5 iterations). Observe that as expected, the output values are no larger than R * after the first iteration.
Conclusion and future directions
The flexibility and autonomy of freelance work on service platforms is accompanied by the significant risk resulting from the lack of stability and benefits associated with full time employment.
Effectively mitigating these risks is critical to the long-run success of the gig economy. Understanding and addressing the different operational challenges that workers face can not only directly improve short-term outcomes for the workers, but it can also help the platforms predict overall system behavior and design effective controls that improve efficiency in the long-term.
There are several interesting avenues for further investigation. It would be useful to have a deeper understanding of situations where price discrimination due to systemic reasons are necessary for whether and how they must price discriminate? As suggested by the present work, the key is in being able to intuitively argue about per-unit-time opportunity costs of different job types in a given setting.
Another issue is that of learning customer preferences. In the present work, I assumed that the worker knows the distribution of the customers' per-unit-time willingness to pay. It would be interesting to explore how these distributions can be learned while strategically experimenting with prices. This aligns with the theme of pricing under demand learning that has been popular in the operations management literature in the recent years. The novel aspect here is the need to account for externalities imposed by accepting jobs on the intertwined goals of revenue maximization and demand learning. I am optimistic that the structure of the optimal pricing solution and especially the iterative procedure that I presented in this paper will inform the design of good 'learning while earning' pricing strategies in this setting.
